







A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE NEW PORTUGUESE 
EQUITY CROWDFUNDING REGIME 
 
 
CLARA MARTINS PEREIRA 
PHD STUDENT 













Clara Martins Pereira  Working paper 12/2017 
2 
 
Abstract: Crowdfunding is an alternative source of financing that allows entrepreneurs 
to raise funds from a multitude of potential investors through the use of Internet-
based electronic platforms. Amongst the different models of crowdfunding, equity 
crowdfunding in particular has been growing in popularity with smaller European 
firms. Several European Union Member States have begun to enact sets of rules 
specifically aimed at encouraging its development as a financing model that is both 
attractive for small companies and safe for investors – with Portugal recently joining 
their ranks. This article discusses whether Portugal has been able to design an equity 
crowdfunding regime capable of ensuring its sustainable growth as a viable funding 
alternative for its growing market of small and medium-sized enterprises, without 
compromising the safety of Portuguese investors. 
Title: A Brief Analysis of the New Portuguese Equity Crowdfunding Regime. 
Keywords: crowfunding, digital platforms, inverstors, equity. 
 
Resumen:  El crowdfunding es una fuente de financiación alternativa que permite a los 
empresarios recaudar fondos de una multitud de potenciales inversores mediante el 
uso de plataformas digitales. Entre los diferentes modelos de crowdfunding el equity 
crowdfunding es el que, en particular, se ha popularizado entre las empresas europeas 
más pequeñas. Varios Estados Miembros de la Unión Europea –entre los que se 
encuentra Portugal– han comenzado a promulgar un conjunto de normas destinadas 
específicamente a fomentarlo. En este artículo se analiza si Portugal ha sido capaz de 
diseñar un régimen capaz de garantizar su crecimiento sostenible como alternativa de 
financiación viable para su creciente mercado de pequeñas y medianas empresas, sin 
comprometer la seguridad de los inversores portugueses. 
Título: Análisis sucinto del nuevo regimen jurídico del micromecenazgo portugués. 
Parabras clave: micromecenazgo, plataformas digitales, inversores, equidad.  
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Crowdfunding is an alternative source of financing that allows entrepreneurs to raise 
funds from a multitude of potential investors through the use of Internet-based 
electronic platforms. Recently, crowdfunding and, particularly, equity crowdfunding (a 
specific type of crowdfunding) have been capturing the attention of firms, academics, 
and regulators around the world. 
The volume of financing raised through crowdfunding campaigns has been growing 
considerably at a global level1 with very significant economic consequences.2 The 
popularity of this tool can be explained by the fact that some firms (particularly small 
and medium-sized start-ups) can experience significant difficulties in accessing more 
typical sources of financing, such as banks, the capital markets, or venture capital 
financiers (like investment funds and business angels). Crowdfunding acts as a 
substitute for these sources of financing3 – and one that allows a venture looking to 
raise finance to depend solely on its ability to demonstrate potential for generating 
profit:4 the identity and geographical location of potential investors become essentially 
irrelevant. 
The use of Internet-based platforms to secure funding has not only contributed to 
decreasing business dependency from traditional sources of financing: crowdfunding 
also offers unique advantages to individual investors, allowing them to access 
community experiences supported by social networks (which act as vehicles for 
establishing effective information channels between entrepreneurs and investors), as 
well as to get involved in projects that are especially meaningful to them, even in 
                                                          
1
 According to a recent report by Mass-Solution, the crowdfunding industry reached $34bn in 
2015. Importantly, the overall volume of the crowdfunding industry has been exponentially growing 
since 2012 – more than doubling each year (see Massolution, ‘2015CF - The Crowdfunding Industry 
Report’ (2015) <http://reports.crowdsourcing.org/index.php?route=product/product&product_id=54> 
accessed 31 March 2017). The growing volume and importance of the crowdfunding industry is also 
highlighted in Paul Belleflamme, Thomas Lambert and Armin Schwienbacher, ‘Crowdfunding: Tapping 
the Right Crowd’ (Social Science Research Network 2013) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1578175 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1578175> accessed 31 March 2017; Thomas Lambert and Armin 
Schwienbacher, ‘An Empirical Analysis of Crowdfunding’ (Study, Université catholique de Louvain and 
University of Amsterdam Business School 2010) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578175> accessed 31 
March 2017; Armin Schwienbacher and Benjamin Larralde, ‘Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial 
Ventures’ (Social Science Research Network 2010) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1699183 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1699183> accessed 31 March 2017. 
2
 Namely, crowdfunding is thought to generate social welfare, to encourage innovation, and to 
promote the creation of new jobs (see Ajay K Agrawal, Christian Catalini and Avi Goldfarb, ‘Some Simple 
Economics of Crowdfunding’ NBER Working Paper No. 19133 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w19133> 
accessed 31 March 2017). 
3
 This idea of ‘substitution’ is illustrated by Agrawal et al in ibid. 
4
 See Belleflamme, Lambert and Schwienbacher (n 3); Lambert and Schwienbacher (n 3); 
Schwienbacher and Larralde (n 3). 
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instances where they are not in a position to make more than a relatively modest 
contribution to the crowdfunding campaign. 
While any entrepreneur or investor engaged in this type of campaigns has access to 
the advantages described above, some of the benefits coming from crowdfunding are 
exclusively associated to particular sub-types of crowdfunding; this allows for the 
differentiation between crowdfunding models according to the diverse nature of the 
benefits enjoyed by participating agents. One of these crowdfunding models in 
particular –‘equity crowdfunding’ – has recently been garnering interest from 
regulators. 
In fact, while equity crowdfunding – where investors acquire participation rights in the 
capital of funded firms in exchange for the financing provided – is becoming an 
increasingly popular model of crowdfunding,5 it has also become linked with a series of 
unique risks for participating investors. As such, regulators around the world have 
begun to enact specific equity crowdfunding regulations in the hopes of encouraging 
its development as a financing model that is both attractive for small companies and 
safe for investors.6 
In Portugal,7 the Parliament recently enacted a crowdfunding act entitled ‘Regime 
Jurídico do Financiamento Colaborativo’ (the ‘Crowdfunding Act’);8 this Act was later 
complemented by a regulation issued by the Portuguese financial securities regulator 
                                                          
5
 It is estimated that, in 2015, the total volume of financing raised by equity crowdfunding 
campaigns was around $2.56bn (see Massolution (n 3)). 
6
 See CrowdfundingHub, ‘Current State of Crowdfunding in Europe: An Overview of the 
Crowdfunding Industry in More than 25 Countries: Trends, Volumes & Regulations ￼’ (2016) 
<https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Entrepreneurship_Centre/Docs/OxEPR2/current-state-
crowdfunding-europe-2016.pdf> accessed 31 March 2017. 
7
 While there is no available data regarding the volume of the equity crowdfunding industry in 
Portugal, the fact that the country is home to a very significant number of small and medium-sized 
companies (accounting for more than 2/3 of total value added compared with an average of 57% in the 
EU) means that equity crowdfunding could have a very significant role to play in Portugal (see European 
Commission, ‘2016 SBA Fact Sheet - Portugal’ (Internal market, industry, entrepreneurship and SMEs 
2016) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/22382/attachments/28/translations/en/renditions/native
> accessed 31 March 2017). This role seams to have been acknowledged by the Portuguese 
Government, which has recently entered into an agreement with Seedrs and Portugal Ventures to 
promote equity crowdfunding in Portugal (see Cristiana Faria Moreira, ‘Estado Junta-Se Ao 
“crowdfunding” Da Seedrs Para Investir Em Startups Portuguesas’ (Observador, 30 March 2017) 
<http://observador.pt/2017/03/30/estado-junta-se-ao-crowdfunding-da-seedrs-para-investir-em-
startups-portuguesas/> accessed 31 March 2017). 
8
 Lei nº 102/2015, de 24 de agosto – Regime Jurídico do Financiamento Colaborativo. 
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‘Comissão para o Mercado de Valores Mobiliários’ (the ‘CMVM’): CMVM Regulation 
1/2016 (the ‘Crowdfunding Regulation’).9 
This article discusses whether the Portuguese Parliament and financial securities 
regulator have been able to design a legal and regulatory regime capable of ensuring 
the sustainable growth of equity crowdfunding as an alternative source of financing for 
Portuguese small and medium-sized enterprises (‘SME’s’), without compromising the 
safety of Portuguese investors. 
2. Regulating equity crowdfunding in the European Union 
2.1. Regulating equity crowdfunding 
The particular configuration of most equity crowdfunding regimes around the world 
seems to rest on the search for a balance between two (apparently) conflicting values: 
the stimulation of the economy and investor protection.10 
This tension can roughly be described as follows: on the one hand, the absence of 
regulation, or the adoption of less rigid rules tend to stimulate the use of 
crowdfunding tools and the growth of the real economy (to the extent that the 
imposition of obligations on the beneficiaries of crowdfunding makes is more 
expensive – or outright impossible – to turn to this form of financing); on the other 
hand, the introduction of harsher crowdfunding regulations might be crucial to ensure 
the protection of investors (insofar as they benefit from the duties imposed on 
entrepreneurs and crowdfunding platforms). 
Broadly speaking, investor protection might be seen as a goal that is at least partly 
achieved at the cost of imposing more obligations on the beneficiaries of crowdfunding 
and, indirectly, at the cost of economic development. 
The relationship between the values of stimulating business activity and ensuring 
investor protection is not, however, as antagonistic as it may appear at first. Investor 
confidence is, in fact, a necessary condition for economic growth: the existence of 
unreasonable information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and investors leads to 
suboptimal equilibria and to the formation of markets for lemons, ie, to market failure 
scenarios where investors set the terms of the financing based on the premise that 
                                                          
9
 Regulamento da CMVM nº 1/2016 – Financiamento Colaborativo de Capital ou por 
Empréstimo. 
10
 For a brief account of how crowdfunding regulation must strike a careful balance between 
these two values, see C Steven Bradford, ‘Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws’ (Social Science 
Research Network 2012) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1916184 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1916184> 
accessed 29 January 2016. 
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they have very little information about the object of their investment; this leads to 
adverse selection problems and encourages the disproportionate appearance of 
ventures of substandard quality, as well as the tendency for an overall inefficient 
allocation of funds.11 
In other words: crowdfunding can only become a viable means of financing – and one 
that is capable of stimulating the economy – if investors feel safe and informed, and if 
rules to minimise instances of fraudulent behaviour are implemented. To the extent 
that entrepreneurs may not have the incentives or the means needed to ensure an 
appropriate level of investor protection, this role might fall upon regulators.12 
Before assessing how equity crowdfunding has been approached by the Portuguese 
regulators, it is important to first understand how this model of crowdfunding has 
been allowed to develop under the applicable European Union (‘EU’) rules. 
2.2. The development of equity crowdfunding within the European 
Union 
The development of equity crowdfunding within the EU seems to have been the 
product of three concurring factors: (i) the inexistence of a unified EU regime 
specifically applicable to equity crowdfunding; (ii) the significant degree of freedom 
granted to Member States by the EU Prospectus Directive in regard to small volume 
public offers; and (iii) the fact that most Member States long hesitated to make use of 
that freedom to regulate equity crowdfunding.13 
Equity crowdfunding was thus permitted to flourish in a legal vacuum that allowed for 
its growth through the development of a variety of crowdfunding structures.14 
                                                          
11
 See George A Akerlof, ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism’ (1970) 84 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 488. 
12
 In particular, it is important to note that any spontaneous signals given by crowdfunding 
beneficiaries will only be efficient if they are observable by investors, and if these can distinguish them 
from false signals. For that reason, the cost of producing these signals is not always outweighed by the 
benefits of signalling (see Gerrit KC Ahlers and others, ‘Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding’ 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2161587> accessed 31 March 2017). 
13
 See Lars Hornuf and Armin Schwienbacher, ‘Should Securities Regulation Promote 
Crowdinvesting?’ (Social Science Research Network 2015) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2412124 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2412124> accessed 29 January 2016. 
14
 Included in these different funding models are simple profit/revenue sharing schemes, 
structures where a third party acquires shares on behalf of one or more investors, structures where the 
shares are directly bought by the investors without any intermediation by third parties, a participation 
model where one or more investors enter into a contract with a third party who invests on their behalf, 
and structures that make use of convertible bonds, where debt is converted into equity when certain 
conditions are met – for example, when the company enters into a second financing round (see Space 
Tex Capital Partners, ‘Crowdfunding Innovative Ventures in Europe: The Financial Ecosystem and 
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However, the last few years have witnessed a rising consensus that the benefits 
associated with this source of finance are counterbalanced by an array of very 
significant risks: while the growth of equity crowdfunding can be very beneficial to the 
economy, the absence of regulation – especially to the extent that it leads to 
fraudulent behaviour – can quickly turn this growth into failure. 
For this reason, several EU Member States gradually started to fill the legal vacuum in 
which equity crowdfunding had been allowed to operate thus far – with Portugal 
recently joining the ranks of Member States that have opted to enact specific equity 
crowdfunding regulations. 
2.3. Defining the legal vacuum 
It is true that the European Commission seems to have been aware of the potential 
benefits and risks associated with equity crowdfunding for some time now;15 however, 
it never decided to target this crowdfunding model with a specific EU-based regulatory 
regime. As such, at a EU level, equity crowdfunding is currently only constrained by the 
directives and regulations generally applicable to capital raising within the EU, 
regardless of whether it is done trough electronic or non-electronic platforms. 
Two pieces of legislation16 are especially important to illustrate the set of EU rules 
generally applicable to most fund-raising activities (and, for that reason, potentially 
applicable to equity crowdfunding campaigns and the electronic platforms hosting 
them): the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (‘MiFID’),17 applicable to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Regulatory Landscape’ (European Commission DG Communications Networks, Content & Technology 
2014) 30-CE-0614273/00-88). 
15
 Cf Comissão Europeia, ‘Comunicação da Comissão ao Parlamento Europeu, ao Conselho, ao 
Comité Económico e Social Europeu e ao Comité Das Regiões: Aproveitar o Potencial do Financiamento 
Coletivo na União Europeia’ (2014) COM(2014) 172 final. 
16
 The Capital Requirements Regulation could also be relevant to crowdfunding platforms but it 
seems that most (if not all) platforms may fall under the exclusion in Article 4 (1) (2) (c): ‘firms which are 
not authorised to provide the ancillary service referred to in point (1) of Section B of Annex I to Directive 
2004/39/EC, which provide only one or more of the investment services and activities listed in points 1, 
2, 4 and 5 of Section A of Annex I to that Directive, and which are not permitted to hold money or 
securities belonging to their clients and which for that reason may not at any time place themselves in 
debt with those clients.’ For the notion that Article 4 (1)(2) (c) could be used as the basis for the creation 
of a pan-European crowdfunding passport, see Dirk A Zetzsche and Christina Preiner, ‘Cross-Border 
Crowdfunding – Towards a Single Crowdfunding Market for Europe’ (Social Science Research Network 
2017) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2991610 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3031837> accessed 31 
March 2017. 
17
 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
markets in financial instruments, soon to be replaced by Directive 2014/65/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 (MiFID II) and Regulation (EU) No. 600/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 (MiFIR). 
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investment firms,18 and the Prospectus Directive,19 applicable to funding campaigns 
that are addressed to a multitude of potential investors and which, for that reason, are 
classified by the Prospectus Directive as public offers.20 
Crucially, the application of the Prospectus Directive to public offers knows some 
exceptions. For the purposes of this analysis, it is important to note, in particular, that 
this directive does not apply to securities included in an offer with a total value of less 
than €5,000,000 (calculated over a 12-month period).21 This means that EU Member 
States have significant leeway to determine the obligations imposed on issuers of 
public offerings with a value lower than €5,000,000.22 
Insofar as the benefits associated with equity crowdfunding relate to the financing of 
small enterprises that do not have access to traditional means of financing, it is 
precisely these offers of less than € 5,000,000 that should be targeted by a special 
regime capable of allowing access to financing unconstrained by the harsher 
obligations proposed by the Prospectus Directive, without failing to ensure a minimum 
level of investor protection. 
In the end, it seems clear that the national equity crowdfunding regimes successively 
enacted by Member States thus originated as complementary rules to the regime 
generally applicable to public offers of more than €5,000,000 under the (generally 
more demanding) Prospectus Directive. The remainder of this article discusses the 
Portuguese equity crowdfunding regime that was allowed to develop in the absence of 
specific EU-level rules. 
3. The Portuguese solution 
3.1. The Portuguese Securities Code 
In Portugal, the MiFID and the Prospectus Directive have essentially been transposed 
by the Portuguese Securities Code (‘Código dos Valores Mobiliários’ or ‘CVM’). The 
                                                          
18
 See Article 4 (1) (1) of MiFID. 
19
 Directive 2010/73/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010, 
soon to be replaced by Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
June 2017 (the ‘Prospectus Regulation’). 
20
 According to Article 2 (1) (d) of the Prospectus Directive, an ‘offer of securities to the public’ 
means a communication to persons in any form and by any means, presenting sufficient information on 
the terms of the offer and the securities to be offered, so as to enable an investor to decide to purchase 
or subscribe to these securities.’ 
21
 See Article 1 (2) (h) Prospectus Directive. 
22
 Still, under Article 3 (1) (e) of the Prospectus Directive, Member States are not allowed, under 
any circumstances, to apply the obligation to publish a prospectus to investors making offers of 
securities with a total consideration of less than €100,000, calculated over a period of 12 months. 
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rules in the Portuguese Securities Code effectively serve as the background to the 
more specific equity crowdfunding rules recently enacted by the Portuguese 
Parliament and financial securities regulator. 
The analysis of this new special legal regime must thus be preceded by a clear 
understanding of the rules in the Portuguese Securities Code that are likely to be 
relevant in the context of equity crowdfunding: (a) the rules pertaining to ‘public offers 
of securities’, as equity crowdfunding campaigns are likely to fall under this category; 
(b) the regime applicable to publicly-held companies, since most companies financed 
through equity crowdfunding will often be classified as publicly-held firms; and (c) the 
rules applicable to financial intermediation, as crowdfunding platforms typically pursue 
activities accessible only to duly licensed financial intermediaries. 
a. Equity crowdfunding campaigns as public offers 
The notion that equity crowdfunding campaigns might fall under the category of 
‘public offers’ comes from Article 109 (1) of the Portuguese Securities Code: according 
to this provision, public offers are those ‘related to securities that are addressed, in 
whole or in part, to undetermined recipients’,23 with Article 109 (3) of the Portuguese 
Securities Code adding that an offer is also public when ‘it is preceded by or 
accompanied of... promotional advertising’,24 and, at any rate, when ‘it addresses at 
least 150 non-qualified investors residing or otherwise established in Portugal’.25 
To the extent that a crowdfunding campaign targets a set of undetermined recipients 
or, in any case, a specific number of recipients above 150, it will almost certainly be 
classified a public offer under the Portuguese Securities Code. Even if the number of 
(pre-determined) recipients targeted by an equity crowdfunding campaign is, for some 
reason, less than 150, the notion that an offer is public when it is preceded by or 
accompanied of promotional advertising has the effect of placing most equity 
crowdfunding campaigns within the category of ‘public offers’.26 
An entrepreneur hosting a campaign classified as a ‘public offer’ is usually forced to 
comply with the duties contained in Title III of the Portuguese Securities Code – and, in 
particular, with the especially exacting duty to issue a prospectus.27 Still, Article 111 (1) 
of the Portuguese Securities Code provides that certain offers are exempted from 
                                                          
23
 See Article 109 (1) of the Portuguese Securities Code. 
24
 See Article 109 (3) (b) of the Portuguese Securities Code. 
25
 See Article 109 (3) (c) of the Portuguese Securities Code. 
26
 If a crowdfunding campaign is exclusively addressed to qualified investors (listed in Article 30 of 
the Portuguese Securities Code) it might be qualified as a private offer under Article 110 of the 
Portuguese Securities Code – instead of falling under the category of public offer; however, most 
crowdfunding campaigns are likely to be classified as public offers. 
27
 Cf Articles 134-155 of the Portuguese Securities Code. 
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these duties. Amongst the exceptions listed in this article, there is one, in particular, 
that makes use of the freedom granted by the EU legislator and prescribes that the 
Prospectus Directive is not applicable to a public offering of securities valued at less 
than € 5,000,000. According to Article 111 (1) (i) of the Portuguese Securities Code, 
such offers are not covered by the harsher provisions of the Prospectus Directive, and 
are further exempt from the obligations set forth in Title III of the Portuguese 
Securities Code. 
At the end of the day, it is clear that even if most equity crowdfunding campaigns do 
end up falling under the category of public offers, many of these offers – all those that 
do not exceed €5,000,00028 – will actually be exempt from the duties included in Title 
III of the Portuguese Securities Code. 
b. Companies financed through equity crowdfunding as publicly-held companies 
The idea that most companies financed through equity crowdfunding will be classified 
as publicly held companies comes from Article 13 of the Portuguese Securities Code. 
According to this provision, a company will have become publicly-traded after it has 
been incorporated through a public offer for subscription, once it has issued securities 
that have been the object of a public offer, or, in any case, if more than 10% of its 
capital has ever been offered to the public.29 
Enterprises that earn the classification of ‘publicly-held companies’ become subject to 
the duties listed in Chapter IV of the Portuguese Securities Code, with no exemptions 
available to companies specifically financed through equity crowdfunding. 
c. Crowdfunding platforms as financial intermediaries 
Finally, it is important to note that the activity pursued by equity crowdfunding 
platforms typically falls under the notion of ‘financial intermediation’30 put forth by 
Article 289 of the Portuguese Securities Code, insofar as such platforms provide 
‘services and activities related to the investment in financial instruments’,31 including, 
crucially, the ‘reception and transmission of orders for the account of clients’,32 namely 
by ‘bringing together two ore more investors with the purpose of executing a 
transaction’. 
                                                          
28
 See Article 1 (2) (h) of the Prospectus Directive. 
29
 See Article 13 (1) (a), (b) and (d) of the Portuguese Securities Code. 
30
 See Article 289 (1) (a) of the Portuguese Securities Code. 
31
 See Article 290 (1) (a) of the Portuguese Securities Code. 
32
 See Article 290 (2) (a) of the Portuguese Securities Code. 
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As financial intermediation activities can only be legally pursued by financial 
intermediaries,33 ie, entities whose occupation includes the provision of investment 
services to third parties on a professional basis, or regularly dealing on own account, it 
seems certain that crowdfunding platforms need to register as financial intermediaries 
under Article 293 (1) of the Portuguese Securities Code34 and are, as such, subject to 
the duties contained in its Title VI (and which arise from the transposition of the 
MiFID). 
d. Setting the grounds for a Portuguese crowdfunding regime 
In the end, it is possible to conclude that (a) the majority of Portuguese equity 
crowdfunding campaigns will fall under the category of public offers (but, more likely 
than not, in the category of public offers that do not exceed €5,000,000 over a period 
of 12 months and that, as such, benefit from the exception that excludes them from 
the obligation to issue a prospectus), that (ii) companies financed through 
crowdfunding will, in may cases, become publicly-held companies (and thus become 
subject to their respective regime), and, finally, that (iii) crowdfunding platforms 
should register as financial intermediaries and obey the corresponding duties included 
in the Portuguese Securities Code. 
 Ultimately, all the aforementioned rules serve one of the two (apparently 
conflicting) goals described earlier: while the regime applicable to publicly-held 
companies and the duties arising from the status of ‘financial intermediary’ are geared 
towards investor protection, the exception that excludes offers of less than €5,000,000 
(over a period of 12 months) from the general public offer regime contained in the 
Portuguese Securities Code – and, particularly, from the heavy duties prescribed in its 
Title III – creates the conditions for crowdfunding to become a viable financing 
alternative for SMEs. 
 At the end of the day, the legal vacuum created by the Prospectus Directive – 
and in which equity crowdfunding was allowed to develop within the EU – is not filled 
by the Portuguese Securities Code in any significant way: it is instead allowed to 
perpetuate. It was not until the approval of a new crowdfunding regime – comprised 
by the Crowdfunding Act and by the Crowdfunding Regulation (together the 
‘Portuguese Crowdfunding Regime’) – that Portugal attempted to devise a set of rules 
specifically geared towards protecting investors in the particular context of equity 
crowdfunding campaigns. The remainder of this article seeks to evaluate whether the 
Portuguese Crowdfunding Regime succeeds in protecting such investors without 
                                                          
33
 See Article 289 (2) of the Portuguese Securities Code. 
34
 This understanding is confirmed by Article 15 of the Crowdfunding Act. 
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compromising the viability of equity crowdfunding as an alternative source of 
financing, particularly for smaller enterprises. 
3.2. The Portuguese Crowdfunding Regime 
The recently enacted Portuguese Crowdfunding Regime is comprised by the 
Crowdfunding Act and by the Crowdfunding Regulation. Yet, while both pieces of 
legislation have now been passed and approved, equity crowdfunding in Portugal is 
actually still exclusively regulated by the Portuguese Securities Code, ie, the statute 
that transposed MiFID and the Prospectus Directive into Portuguese law. 
This is because, pursuant to Article 25 of the Crowdfunding Act, the provisions of the 
act on equity crowdfunding will only come into force upon the entry of force of the 
Crowdfunding Regulation. This regulation, in turn, will only come into force once an 
additional piece of legislation concerning the violation of the provisions included in the 
Crowdfunding Regulation comes into force – which it has not.35 
This article thus analyses the legal regime that is likely to govern equity crowdfunding 
in Portugal in the near future. For that reason, it is entirely unable to consider the 
effect that such a regime has had on the equity crowdfunding activity currently taking 
place in Portugal; it merely speculates whether the rules enacted will have a positive 
or a negative impact on entrepreneurs and investors. 
a. Scope of application 
The Crowdfunding Act defines the legal framework36 applicable to all forms of collaborative 
financing:37 donation-based, rewards-based, equity, and debt crowdfunding.38 The 
Crowdfunding Regulation, on the other hand, applies solely to equity and debt crowdfunding.39 
This article is exclusively focused on the rules within the Portuguese Crowdfunding Regime 
that apply to equity crowdfunding and in evaluating whether these rules can work as balanced 
measures for the protection of investors. 
                                                          
35
 See Article 21 of the Crowdfunding Regulation. 
36
 See Article 1 of the Crowdfunding Act. 
37
 See Articles 1 and 3 of the Crowdfunding Act. 
38
 This means that the Crowdfunding Act applies to all fundraising activities that fall under the 
(problematic) ‘crowdfunding’ definition included in its Article 2, ie, regardless of whether they raise any 
legal issues requiring specific legislative treatment, and regardless of whether such activities are also 
covered by the regime applicable to public offerings under the Portuguese Securities Code, namely 
because they do not fall within the ‘valued at less than €5,000,000’ exception. 
39
 See Article 1 (2) of the Crowdfunding Regulation. 
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b. Measures for the protection of investors 
Investors participating in equity crowdfunding experience significant risks both during 
the campaign stage and throughout the life of the funded company: at the campaign 
stage, research shows that investors tend to be overly optimistic (despite the high 
degree of information asymmetry and the complexities of company valuation), as well 
as to engage in herding behaviour, particularly as the campaign starts accumulating 
capital or approaching its end; throughout the life of the funded company, investors 
face instead the governance problems arising from the dispersed shareholder base 
that typically results from the crowdfunding campaign (both in terms of holdings’ size 
and geographical dispersion), as well as difficulties in accessing information. 
The Crowdfunding Act and the Crowdfunding Regulation attempt to protect investors 
from these risks through a set of measures that regulate (i) electronic crowdfunding 
platforms, (ii) the duties of the beneficiaries of equity crowdfunding campaigns, (iii) 
the content of the campaigns themselves, and (iv) investment in equity crowdfunding. 
The next sections engage critically with the measures adopted under the Portuguese 
Crowdfunding Regime with the purpose of determining whether they are able to 
protect investors in equity crowdfunding – both as initial participants in the 
crowdfunding campaigns and as shareholders in the funded companies – while 
preserving equity crowdfunding as an attractive financing option for small businesses. 
Regulating crowdfunding platforms 
Both the Crowdfunding Act and Crowdfunding Regulation devote a series of specific 
provisions to the regulation of the activity of crowdfunding platforms.40 Particularly in 
what concerns platforms hosting equity crowdfunding campaigns, Article 15 (1) of the 
Crowdfunding Act imposes a duty to register with the CMVM as a precondition for 
operating, with paragraph (2) of the same article tasking the CMVM with supervising 
these platforms. Article 15 of the Crowdfunding Act further requires the registration of 
crowdfunding platforms as financial intermediaries under articles 289ff of the 
Portuguese Securities Code, endorsing the understanding that they must indeed be 
registered in this capacity (and that they are, as such, subject to the corresponding 
Portuguese Securities Code duties). 
                                                          
40
 Even though the Crowdfunding Act (unlike the Crowdfunding Regulation) often refers to the 
duties of crowdfunding platforms, such reference is a simplification. Under Portuguese law, these 
crowdfunding platforms do not have a separate legal personality and cannot be the subjects of rights 
and obligations. Such rights and obligations are, instead, applicable to the legal entities that manage the 
crowdfunding platforms. This article too, embraces this simplification and refers to ‘crowdfunding 
platforms’ even when it means the entities that manage them. 
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Once duly registered, crowdfunding platforms are included in a regularly updated list 
publicised through the CMVM website.41 From that moment on, registered platforms 
become subject to a series of obligations, including the duty to ensure that investors 
have access to all the information necessary to make informed investment decisions, 
as per Article 14 (2) of the Crowdfunding Act and Article 16 (3) of the Crowdfunding 
Regulation. 42 For that purpose, crowdfunding platforms must specifically supply 
investors in crowdfunding campaigns with the information listed in Article 16 of the 
Crowdfunding Regulation.43 
Particularly in the case of equity crowdfunding, the beneficiaries of the crowdfunding 
campaigns must file yearly activity reports with the crowdfunding platforms that 
hosted their financing – and these platforms are then legally obliged to ensure that 
these reports are made available for consultation by the investors.44 
The Crowdfunding Act is also concerned with preventing potential conflicts of interest 
between crowdfunding platforms and investors:45 under Article 5 (2) of the 
Crowdfunding Act, crowdfunding platforms are specifically prohibited from providing 
advice or recommendations regarding investment in securities, from engaging in the 
management of investment funds, or from holding and trading securities on own 
account.46 In addition, crowdfunding platforms have a general duty to comply with any 
regulations enacted by the CMVM with the purpose of preventing fraudulent 
behaviour,47 as well as with a series of rules on internal organisation and conduct.48 
All in all, it is clear that, under the Portuguese Crowdfunding Regime, all equity 
crowdfunding activity must be facilitated by a particular type of financial intermediary 
that is both subject to the duties generally applicable to financial intermediaries under 
Title IV of the Portuguese Securities Code, and to the additional duties contained in the 
Crowdfunding Regulation. 
This especially demanding set of duties seems to have the purpose of transforming 
crowdfunding platforms into gatekeepers of crowdfunding investment, entrusting 
                                                          
41
 See Article 8 of the Crowdfunding Regulation. 
42
 Cf Article 5 (1) (a) of the Crowdfunding Act. 
43
 In fact, the Crowdfunding Regulation specifically makes crowdfunding platforms responsible for 
ensuring the authenticity and intelligibility of the information provided by the crowdfunding 
beneficiaries during the campaign phase; these platforms are also responsible for ensuring that 
investors receive and acknowledge all information disclosed (see Article 17 (1) of the Crowdfunding 
Regulation). 
44
 See Article 17 (2) of the Crowdfunding Act. 
45
 Article 11 of the Crowdfunding Act further states that the structure and organisation of 
crowdfunding platforms should allow them to identify and prevent possible conflicts of interests. 
46
 See Article 5 (2) (a) and (c) of the Crowdfunding Act. 
47
 See Article 16 of the Crowdfunding Act and Article 10 (1) (c) of the Crowdfunding Regulation. 
48
 See Article 10 of the Crowdfunding Act and Articles 10 and 11 of the Crowdfunding Regulation. 
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them with a key role in protecting investors both during the initial phase of the 
crowdfunding campaign (where they are responsible for the truthfulness and 
completeness of the information provided by the crowdfunding beneficiaries) and 
during the day-to-day governance of the financed company (where they continue to 
receive, retain, and distribute yearly activity reports from these beneficiaries). For that 
reason, the legal regime imposed on crowdfunding platforms is one of the 
cornerstones that underpin the Portuguese Crowdfunding Regime – and one that can 
help investors throughout the entire life of their investment. 
At the end of the day, the imposition of these added duties on crowdfunding platforms 
– information duties, conflict of interests duties, anti-fraud provisions and conduct and 
organisation rules – may lead to an increase in the costs inherent to this type of 
financing (to the extent that such costs are at least partially passed on to the 
entrepreneurs resorting to equity crowdfunding); however, these added duties might 
also turn the entities in the best position and with the greatest incentives to monitor 
the beneficiaries of equity crowdfunding – the crowdfunding platforms – into an 
effective defence bastion for investors.49 
Regulating the duties of the beneficiaries of equity crowdfunding campaigns 
The Crowdfunding Act and Crowdfunding Regulation also impose duties on the 
beneficiaries of equity crowdfunding campaigns, requiring them to fulfil certain 
obligations both towards crowdfunding platforms, directly, and towards the investors 
participating in such campaigns, indirectly. 
Firstly, the Crowdfunding Act requires that the relationship between the beneficiaries 
of crowdfunding and crowdfunding platforms be governed by a written agreement50 
and characterised by a continuous flow of information.51 This continuous flow of 
information should include the nature and identity of the beneficiaries of the 
                                                          
49
 Still, it should be noted that, even in the absence of any specific rules, a crowdfunding platform 
would always have the incentive to use its internal rules so as to maximise the number of transactions it 
intermediates; in other words, crowdfunding platforms would always have an incentive to achieve a 
satisfactory balance between the minimisation of the administrative costs of launching a crowdfunding 
campaign and investor protection (see Agrawal, Catalini and Goldfarb (n 4)). This incentive is further 
amplified by the fact that crowdfunding platforms compete amongst each other for the possibility to 
host a particular crowdfunding campaign (namely because each crowdfunding campaign can only be 
hosted by one single platform under Article 13 (2) of the Crowdfunding Act).  
50
 See Article 6 (1) of the Crowdfunding Act. 
51
 See Article 7 (2) of the Crowdfunding Act. Also according to Article 17 (1) of the Crowdfunding 
Act, the beneficiaries of equity crowdfunding campaigns must disclose to crowdfunding platforms and 
to the CMVM itself all relevant information regarding their identity (including their capital structure). 
Under this article, the beneficiaries of this particular model of crowdfunding must also inform the 
crowdfunding platforms of their compliance with any tax duties. 
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crowdfunding campaigns,52 a detailed description of the activities and projects that are 
being funded, the funding goal and deadline of each crowdfunding campaign,53 the 
subscription price of each security (or the mechanisms for determining such price), and 
any other elements that may be required by the CMVM.54 
 This information must be communicated in advance – and in relation to each 
offer55 – through a form addressed to the crowdfunding platform and entitled ‘Key 
Information for Investors in Equity Crowdfunding’ (‘Informações Fundamentais 
destinadas aos Investidores de Financiamento Colaborativo’ or ‘IFIFC’).56 
It should be noted that the IFIFC is required to contain all the elements necessary for 
someone to make an informed investment decision that adequately takes into account 
the characteristics and risks of a crowdfunding offer;57 it is then up to the 
crowdfunding platforms to make this document available to investors, along with a 
series of consumer warnings.58 Both the IFIFC and these warnings should specifically be 
mentioned in any promotional advertising of the campaign.59 
The continuity of this information flow extends beyond the campaign stage and the 
IFIFC: crowdfunding beneficiaries are subject to information duties that continue to 
apply throughout the life of the funded company; namely, these entrepreneurs have 
an obligation to submit yearly activity reports to the CMVM (which must then make 
them available to investors in the terms described above),60 as well as the general duty 
to provide crowdfunding platforms with continuous updates regarding their identity 
and legal status.61 
In the end, and despite the confusing wording of some of the articles devoted to 
regulating the information duties owed to investors by the beneficiaries of 
crowdfunding campaigns, it seems that several aspects of these duties constitute a 
welcome protection tool for investors in equity crowdfunding. In particular, adding a 
                                                          
52
 See Article 7 (2) of the Crowdfunding Act. 
53
 See Article 19 (1) of the Crowdfunding Act. According to paragraph (2) of the same article, the 
exact content of the information duty regarding the funding goal and deadline of the crowdfunding 
campaign is to be determined by the CMVM in future regulations. It is hard to understand the reason for 
this provision and, in truth, no provision in the Crowdfunding Regulation provides further detail on how 
this information duty might vary. Taking into account that such a duty seems to have a fairly objective 
content, it is difficult to phantom how this duty could actually vary (unless the legislator wanted to give 
the CMVM the opportunity to ask for information on value intervals, as opposed to exact values).  
54
 See Article 19 of the Crowdfunding Act. 
55
 See Article 16 (1) of the Crowdfunding Regulation. 
56
 See Article 16 (1) of the Crowdfunding Regulation. 
57
 See Article 17 (1) of the Crowdfunding Act and Article 16 (3) of the Crowdfunding Regulation. 
58
 See Article 16 (2) of the Crowdfunding Regulation. 
59
 See Article 18 of the Crowdfunding Regulation. 
60
 See Article 17 (2) of the Crowdfunding Act. 
61
 See Article 7(2) of the Crowdfunding Act. 
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duty to periodically update the information initially conveyed to investors (via the 
crowdfunding platforms) crucially addresses the problem of access to information 
typically experienced by minority shareholders throughout the life of companies with 
dispersed shareholding structures (which are likely to follow equity crowdfunding 
campaigns).62 
The only problem arising from these information duties relates, of course, to the costs 
that such obligations may entail for the beneficiaries of crowdfunding campaigns, and 
a balance needs to be struck between the need to protect and inform investors and 
the need to keep the administrative costs of equity crowdfunding low. 
In this respect, the balance achieved by the Portuguese regime appears to be 
satisfactory in that the information initially requested of crowdfunding beneficiaries is 
transmitted to the crowdfunding platform via a standardised form and is exempt from 
external certification.63 The use of a standardised form, in particular, not only reduces 
the costs of meeting the information duties that fall upon crowdfunding beneficiaries, 
but also gives investors an instrument that allows them to easily compare benefits and 
risks across crowdfunding campaigns.64 
Still – and even though the inclusion of specific consumer warnings in the IFIFC is a 
step in the right direction – the regulator could have gone further in its protection of 
unqualified investors in equity crowdfunding campaigns by taking a more active role in 
their education.65 For example, the CMVM could require that access to IFIFCs be 
preceded by the mandatory viewing of informative videos on equity crowdfunding, or 
by the mandatory answering of a questionnaire on the benefits and risks of this form 
of financing. Such measures could serve to combat the apathy usually associated with 
written notices and warnings,66 without substantially adding to the costs of 
crowdfunding campaigns.67 
Regulating the content of equity crowdfunding campaigns 
                                                          
62
 According to Ahlers, the success of equity crowdfunding crucially depends on companies 
making prospective information available, namely regarding their financial prospects, relevant risk 
factors and internal governance mechanisms. Investors will be especially concerned with the credentials 
of the management team, as well as with the availability of pre-planned exit strategies (see Ahlers and 
others (n 11)). 
63
 A study by Ahlers shows that the external certification of information disclosed in a 
crowdfunding campaign does not significantly impact its success (see ibid). 
64
 Bradford (n 12). 
65
 See Agrawal, Catalini and Goldfarb (n 4). 
66
 See Ahlers and others (n 14). 
67
 This goal could be achieved particularly to the extent that such videos and questionnaires can 
be standardised. 
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The information duties that fall upon crowdfunding platforms and beneficiaries are far 
from being the only sort of protection measures that investors in equity crowdfunding 
are able to enjoy under the Portuguese Equity Crowdfunding Regime. In fact, both the 
Crowdfunding Act and the Crowdfunding Regulation complement these information 
duties with a series of rules that govern the actual content of the offers that are the 
object of equity crowdfunding campaigns. 
Crucially, Article 18 of the Crowdfunding Act establishes that the value of the offers 
made available through equity crowdfunding campaigns should be subject to certain 
ceilings. Article 19 of the Crowdfunding Regulation then defines these value ceilings in 
the following way:68 
 
Offers made to a) legal persons or b) natural 
persons with a yearly income of ≥ €70,000  
All other offers 
Per offer €5,000,000 €1,000,000 
Per activity/ product (over a 
period of 12 months and 




According to the explanatory note that accompanies the Crowdfunding Regulation, the 
option to limit the amount that can be raised through crowdfunding platforms to a 
number between €1,000,000 and €5,000,000 (depending on the profile of the offer 
recipients) has the purpose of ‘limiting the access to equity crowdfunding campaigns 
to those investors who are in the best position to access this type of investment’. 
It seems right to regulate the access of investors to equity crowdfunding campaigns – 
namely by limiting the amount that each individual investor is allowed to contribute to 
the campaign – but it is harder to understand how limiting the overall amount that can 
be gathered using equity crowdfunding fulfils that purpose; that is, instead, the role of 
the mechanisms included in article 20 of Crowdfunding Act (and which are discussed in 
the next sub-section of this chapter). 
The limits established by the Portuguese Crowdfunding Regime in regard to the 
amount of financing that can be obtained through equity crowdfunding campaigns 
have, instead, two other effects that contribute little, if anything, to the purpose 
established in the explanatory note that supplements the Crowdfunding Regulation: on 
the one hand, (1) the effect of limiting the number of crowdfunding campaigns legally 
                                                          
68
 See Article 19 (2) and Article 12(2) of the Crowdfunding Regulation. 
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admissible, and, on the other hand (2) the effect of altogether preventing smaller or 
(arguably) less sophisticated investors from participating in generally larger 
crowdfunding campaigns: 
(1) Limiting the number of legally admissible crowdfunding campaigns 
First, it is important to note that Article 2 of the Crowdfunding Act (somehow 
inaccurately) defines crowdfunding as all financing amassed through online electronic 
platforms;69 for that reason, and in all rigour, the effect arising from Article 18 of the 
Crowdfunding Act is actually that of limiting the admissibility of offers intermediated 
by online electronic platforms to those with a value inferior to €5,000,000 (or, in some 
cases €1,000,000) – ie, to those offers that are exempted from the duties listed in Title 
III of the Portuguese Securities Code. 
As a consequence of Articles 2 and 18 of the Crowdfunding Act, no public offer with a 
value higher than €5,000,000, ie, no offer subject to the duties included in Title III of 
the Portuguese Securities Code, can be intermediated by an online electronic platform 
– regardless of whether that online electronic platform is, in fact, a registered financial 
intermediary and regardless of whether such offer effectively complies with the duties 
listed in Title III of the Portuguese Securities Code (including the obligation to issue a 
prospectus). 
It is hard to phantom why it has been decided to prohibit these offers when the only 
thing that distinguishes offers intermediated by an online electronic platform (typically 
equity crowdfunding campaigns) from other public offers of similar value is the nature 
of the agent that intermediates the offer, ie, the fact that such offers are 
intermediated by online electronic platforms; this is particularly puzzling when such 
platforms are, in fact, subject to a more demanding regime70 than that which is 
applicable to the generality of financial intermediaries under Article 113 of the 
Portuguese Securities Code. 
The fact that an offer is intermediated by an online electronic platform does not pose  
– in itself – a particular risk for investors or, in any case, a risk that justifies the outright 
prohibition of offers valued at more than €5,000,000, especially to the extent that such 
offers also have to comply with the provisions included in Title III of the Portuguese 
Securities Code. 
                                                          
69
 For instance, the Crowdfunding Act’s definition of ‘crowdfunding’ entirely disregards that a 
crowdfunding campaign must include an invitation to a multitude of potential investors. 
70
 To the extent that their activity is governed both by the rules applicable to financial 
intermediaries in general and by the specific rules applicable to the electronic platforms that host equity 
crowdfunding campaigns under the Crowdfunding Act and the Crowdfunding Regulation. 
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Even more absurdly, the public offers with values between €1,000,000 and €5,000,000 
that are made to natural persons whose yearly income is less than €70,000 are now 
entirely prohibited if they are made through an online electronic platform – but 
remain almost entirely unregulated if they are, instead, intermediated through any 
other agent (and thus evade the ‘crowdfunding’ definition in Article 2 of the 
Crowdfunding Act and, consequently, the scope of the prohibition included in its 
Article 18). 
These incoherent consequences are the product of an inaccurate understanding of 
how crowdfunding should be regulated. ‘Crowdfunding’ is not a legal concept that can 
be reduced to a definition and regulated through a specific legal regime anchored in 
that definition – it is, instead, an existing factual reality that was born in a legal vacuum 
in need of regulation: that of public offers with a value of less than €5,000,000. As 
such, even through the appearance and development of these smaller offers has been 
encouraged by the existence of Internet-based platforms – and even though it is right 
that these platforms be required to register as financial intermediaries – the regulation 
applicable to the offers themselves should not vary with the identity of the agent 
chosen to intermediate them.71 
(2) Banning smaller/less sophisticated investors from investing in large crowdfunding 
campaigns 
The second effect arising from the limits established by the Portuguese Crowdfunding 
Regime in regard to the amount of financing that can be obtained through equity 
crowdfunding campaigns is that of altogether banning certain investors from 
participating in crowdfunding campaigns of a particular size, in function of the 
investor’s profile. 
It is not clear, however, what purpose was served with this ban: the goal of limiting the 
access to equity crowdfunding to certain investors is already accomplished by Article 
20 of the Crowdfunding Act (which will be analysed later). The only effect arising from 
the distinction made by Article 18 of the Act is rather to encourage the beneficiaries of 
crowdfunding to exclude less sophisticated recipients from campaigns whose goal is to 
raise more than €1,000,000; it seems to assume that campaigns that raise higher 
amounts of capital entail greater risks for investors. 
                                                          
71
 A slightly less harmful variation of this idea could include limits on equity crowdfunding offers 
that would not depend on the total amount of capital amassed over a given period (but would apply to 
individual offers instead): such a provision would at least encourage crowdfunding beneficiaries to 
become repeat players – and the repeated interactions between crowdfunding beneficiaries and 
investors might have the effect of discouraging opportunistic behaviour (see Agrawal, Catalini and 
Goldfarb (n 4)). 
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It is true that if one assumes that the contributions typically made by participants in 
crowdfunding campaigns remain more or less fixed irrespectively of the total target of 
the campaign, Article 18 could actually have the effect of preventing the participation 
of unsophisticated investors in the excessively dispersed shareholding structures that 
often characterise companies financed through equity crowdfunding (and which might 
make it harder for investors to coordinate or care). However, if this was the true goal 
of this provision, there seem to exist more effective (or at least more direct) ways of 
achieving it, namely by imposing a minimum floor on the individual contributions 
made to such campaigns (which could, in turn, vary according to the total amount of 
funding sought). 
In any case, the benefits from preventing the formation of companies with dispersed 
shareholding structures might be quite insignificant when compared to the drawbacks 
of preventing less sophisticated investors from participating in larger crowdfunding 
campaigns: by preventing the participation of these investors in undertakings that do 
not seem to involve any particularly increased risk (at least not by virtue alone of the 
amount being raised),72 the regulator is narrowing the array of circumstances where 
two agents with complementary interests are allowed to an agreement – without 
actually having a very strong reason to interfere. 
And even if it were to be admitted that the limits described above serve indeed a 
useful purpose, one of the differentiation criteria adopted in this provision leaves 
something to be desired: while it is true that income differences are commonly used as 
a proxy for financial sophistication73 (and it is generally assumed that an investor 
earning a higher level of income will be in a better position to cope with the 
consequences from failed investments),74 the distinction drawn between natural 
persons and legal persons can effortlessly be defrauded via the (relatively 
straightforward) incorporation of a new legal person – particularly to the extent that 
the application of Articles 19 (2) and 12 (2) (a) of the Crowdfunding Regulation does 
not depend on whether that new legal person has limited liability. 
In the end, it seems that the ceilings applicable to the value of crowdfunding 
campaigns should altogether be excluded abandoned by the Portuguese Crowdfunding 
Regime. Ultimately, Portugal should not have defined the application scope of the 
                                                          
72
 It could instead be argued that to the extent that any agreement following an equity 
crowdfunding campaign will cease to operate if the campaign is unable to collect the amount of funding 
requested (cf Article 9 (1) of the Crowdfunding Act), any attempt to raise more than €1,000,000 might 
actually be seen as powerful sign that the entrepreneurs seeking finance are convinced of their 
company’s potential. 
73
 It is so because the lack of financial knowledge can generally be overcome through the hiring of 
professional financial advice. 
74
 According to Bradford, the ability to withstand financial loss is a better criteria to differentiate 
between investors than yearly income (as a proxy for financial sophistication) (see Bradford (n 9)).  
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Crowdfunding Act by resorting to a definition of ‘crowdfunding’ and then limited the 
amount that can be raised in campaigns that fall under that very wide definition; it 
would have been preferable to specifically regulate public offers raising less than 
€5,000,000 – with public crowdfunding offers raising more than that amount falling 
only under the scope of the CVM. Such rules could then be complemented by a set of 
provisions specifically applicable to electronic platforms hosting public offers 
(regardless of volume).75 
Still – and in spite of all its shortcomings – the Portuguese Crowdfunding Regime does 
have the merit of containing limitations to the terms in which crowdfunding offers can 
be made (other than those regarding their target amount) that may actually play a 
useful role in protecting investors: one of those rules provides that if a crowdfunding 
campaign fails to reach its target amount any funds originally pledged are returned to 
the investors (Article 9 (1) of the Crowdfunding Act); another states that crowdfunding 
offers must be made available through a single crowdfunding platform (Article 18 (3) 
of the Crowdfunding Act). 
The first limit ensures that investors do not end up financing companies and projects 
that cannot amass the financing that they need in order to succeed (while, at the same 
time, mitigating the effects coming from investors’ natural reluctance to participate in 
the early stages of a crowdfunding campaign);76 the second limit might encourage 
competition amongst platforms, forcing them to provide better conditions for both the 
beneficiaries and the investors in equity crowdfunding campaigns (which can hopefully 
lead to the creation of safer investment environments). 
Regulating investment in equity crowdfunding 
While the limits imposed on the content and configuration of equity crowdfunding 
campaigns generally seem to contribute very little to investment protection, other 
limits included in the Portuguese Crowdfunding Regime – limits specifically targeted at 
investment in equity crowdfunding campaigns – might play a more significant role in 
protecting the backers of such campaigns. 
                                                          
75
 One could speculate that these limits are the product of the careless copying of the US 
crowdfunding regulation model: the model seen in the Jumpstart Our Business Start-ups Act, of 5 April 
2012 (the ‘JOBS Act’). The reason why the JOBS Act relies on these limits is because crowdfunding 
regulation in the US has a different starting point than the EU’s: in the US, equity crowdfunding was 
entirely prohibited until it became admissible under the JOBS Act, with the limits under the JOBS Act 
being used to define its application scope; within the EU, equity crowdfunding campaigns of less than 
€5,000,000 enjoyed the legal vacuum created by the Prospectus Directive and were thus generally 
allowed even before the first crowdfunding-specific regimes started being enacted by the different 
Member States. 
76
 See Agrawal, Catalini and Goldfarb (n 4). 
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Article 20 of the Crowdfunding Act, in particular, stipulates that certain investors are 
subject to investment ceilings that limit how much they can channel to equity 
crowdfunding. These ceilings are applicable both to the amount of money a single 
investor can put into a single crowdfunding campaign and to the amount of money 
that a single investor can devote to equity crowdfunding in general over a given period 
of time.77 
According to Article 12 (1) and (2) of the Crowdfunding Regulation, non-qualified 
investors who are natural persons and who have a yearly income of less than €70,000 
cannot pledge more than €3,000 to a single crowdfunding campaign, nor can they 
invest more than €10,000 in crowdfunding campaigns over a period of 12 months. The 
Crowdfunding Act further requires investors to declare, upon subscription, that they 
are aware of the conditions of the offer that they are accepting – and, particularly, of 
the risks associated with this type of investment78 – as well as to disclose how much 
they spent in crowdfunding campaigns in the previous year79 and how much they earn 
approximately.80 
These barriers to individual investment in equity crowdfunding seem to eliminate – or 
at least significantly reduce – the possibility of investors experiencing catastrophic 
losses as a consequence of their investment: the losses suffered by investors will 
hopefully be sufficiently small so that they can be covered by the individual’s yearly 
income.   
Still, Article 12 of the Crowdfunding Regulation deserves some criticism. Firstly, it can 
be criticised for its imprecision: it is unclear whether the aforementioned limits refer to 
every amount invested in crowdfunding campaigns or whether they apply only to the 
funding of equity crowdfunding campaigns. 
Additionally, it seems that exempting legal persons from these limits – regardless of 
how they are incorporated and whether they enjoy limited liability regimes – again 
provides an easy way for investors to evade them. 
Finally, it is argued that its limits could be a bit more nuanced: maybe investors could 
choose between the absolute limit included in Article 13 (€3,000 per offer or €10,000 
throughout a 12-month period) and a variable limit, calculated as a percentage of their 
yearly income. This would allow for a greater degree of differentiation between 
investors with varying yearly incomes of less than €70,000 and potentially allow for 
                                                          
77
 See Article 20 of the Crowdfunding Act. 
78
 See Article 8 of the Crowdfunding Act. 
79
 See Article 20 (4) of the Crowdfunding Act and Article 12 (3) of the Crowdfunding Regulation. 
80
 See Article 20 (4) of the Crowdfunding Act. 
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more funds to be channelled to equity crowdfunding (yielding an overall increase of 
allocative efficiency). 
3.3. Evaluation of the Portuguese Crowdfunding Regime and suggested 
alternatives 
In light of the analysis of the various investor protection mechanisms included in the 
Portuguese Crowdfunding Regime, it is now time to take a stance regarding its overall 
merits, as well as to discuss some of the alternative regulatory avenues that could have 
been pursued by the Portuguese regulator. 
Firstly, it should be noted that many of the measures implemented under the 
Portuguese Crowdfunding Regime do have the potential to fulfil the dual purpose of 
protecting investors in equity crowdfunding campaigns and preserving the viability of 
equity crowdfunding as an alternative form of financing. In this respect, the 
information duties applicable to crowdfunding beneficiaries – which can be complied 
with by submitting standardised forms and which extend beyond the period of the 
initial campaign – are particularly laudable. The imposition of gatekeeping duties on 
crowdfunding platforms and their categorisation as financial intermediaries are also 
steps in the right direction, turning these platforms into an important mechanism for 
the defence of investors in equity crowdfunding campaigns. 
The aspects of the Portuguese Crowdfunding Regime that deserve the most criticism 
are its over-reliance on a ‘crowdfunding’ definition and the imposition of limits to the 
amounts that can be raised in public offers intermediated by electronic platforms. At 
the end of the day, the Portuguese regulator should have refrained from enshrining a 
definition of ‘crowdfunding’ in the law and rather have devised a legal regime 
generally applicable to (all) public offers of less than €5,000,000 – even if such regime 
would (as it should!) take into account the idiosyncrasies of equity crowdfunding (as a 
de facto reality), or be complemented by a set of rules specifically governing 
crowdfunding platforms. 
Generally, it also seems that the Portuguese Equity Crowdfunding Regime could have 
shown a higher overall regard for the risks run by equity crowdfunding investors in 
their quality as future shareholders of the funded company. 
The risks incurred by investors in equity crowdfunding are not limited to the initial 
campaign stage – but instead extend over the life of the funded company, whose 
governance mechanisms are often insufficient to allow for the adequate monitoring of 
the management by the dispersed shareholder structure that often characterises 
companies financed through equity crowdfunding. 
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Regulatory alternatives capable of dealing with this particular type of risk could include 
the creation of additional monitoring obligations for crowdfunding platforms, who, as 
gatekeepers and intermediaries in the relationship between investors in equity 
crowdfunding campaigns and the beneficiaries of such campaigns, are in a privileged 
position to carry out this additional monitoring. 
Additionally, the legislator could require crowdfunding platforms to provide investors 
in equity crowdfunding with a forum where they could communicate and coordinate 
with other investors in the same campaign;81 maintaining open communication 
channels between investors for the exchange of information and ideas would enable 
investors to monitor the companies financed by them more effectively – particularly 
beyond the initial fundraising phase.82 
Finally, it might also be worth requiring companies financed through equity 
crowdfunding to provide their investors with clear exit strategies, such as mandatory 
tag along rights where the sale of shareholdings by one of the company’s founding 
shareholders would allow minority shareholders to sell their holdings under similar 
conditions. 
4. Conclusion 
In recent years, equity crowdfunding has found itself under the spotlight of academics, 
regulators, and firms. On the one hand, it appears to be growing and effectively 
fulfilling its potential as a viable alternative for small and medium sized companies 
looking to raise capital; on the other hand, there is an increasing awareness of the risks 
run by investors in equity crowdfunding campaigns. 
Equity crowdfunding thus represents a legislative challenge that is both urgent and 
complex: urgent because regulatory apathy might give way to the first scandal capable 
of dictating a premature end to this source of financing, and complex because an 
excessively harsh regulatory regime can also contribute to the early demise of equity 
crowdfunding. 
The regulation of equity crowdfunding must thus strike a satisfactory balance between 
preserving its usefulness for companies that do not have easy access to other financing 
alternatives and protecting those that invest in equity crowdfunding campaigns. But 
that is not enough: a satisfactory equity crowdfunding regime should also encourage 
companies financed in this way to develop a solid corporate governance model 
                                                          
81
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82
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capable of supporting their growth, especially as additional rounds of funding become 
necessary. 
In the end, it is argued that while the Portuguese Crowdfunding Regime does include 
some meritorious investor protection mechanisms, it could nevertheless be further 
improved – in particular through the adoption of regulatory measures aimed at 
ensuring the long-term sustainability of companies funded through equity 
crowdfunding.  
Still, it is to be expected – and it might, to a degree, be desirable – that the regulation 
of equity crowdfunding will be the result of many successive adjustments attempting 
to keep up with a reality that is quite recent and that is still evolving. It is hoped that 
these (predictable) adjustments will lead to a better and more sustainable balance 
between promoting crowdfunding and ensuring the protection of equity crowdfunding 
investors both at the campaign stage and throughout the life of the funded company. 
Such balance will be key to turning equity crowdfunding into a true vehicle for 
economic development. 
Still, limiting the role of equity crowdfunding to that of being an alternative financing 
source for small and medium-sized companies that is (hopefully) also safe for investors 
might be narrow-minded: the benefits of equity crowdfunding are not limited to its 
financing role. Crowdfunding is, first and foremost, a sub-set of crowdsourcing – an 
alternative mechanism for solving problems by leveraging the unique capacities of 
crowds.83 
With the right regulatory regime, equity crowdfunding might give rise to new dynamics 
between entrepreneurs and crowds of small investors that want to use the Internet to 
influence the future of projects that they are passionate about, in contrast with 
traditional notions of rational apathy. With the right set of rules, even larger 
companies or more traditional financial agents might want in on the crowdfunding 
game.84 
It is true that the main goal for any equity crowdfunding regime should be to ensure 
that it becomes a viable, accessible, and safe funding alternative; for that reason, the 
main focus of this article was to evaluate whether the Portuguese Crowdfunding 
                                                          
83
 See Daren C Brabham, ‘Crowdsourcing as a Model for Problem Solving: An Introduction and 
Cases’ (2008) 14 Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies 75; 
Joan MacLeod Heminway and Shelden Ryan Hoffman, ‘Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the 
Securities Act of 1933’ (Social Science Research Network 2012) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1875584 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1875584> accessed 29 January 2016; Jeff Howe, ‘The Rise of 
Crowdsourcing’ (Wired, 1 June 2006) <http://www.wired.com/2006/06/crowds/> accessed 25 February 
2016; James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (First Anchor Books Edition, Abacus 2005). 
84
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Regime has been able to accomplish that goal. Still, it is also argued that regulating 
equity crowdfunding without attempting to preserve what makes it unique and, 
namely, without encouraging its imminently social aspects is ultimately wasteful. 
Hopefully, future research efforts (in the field of Law or elsewhere) may influence the 
regulation of equity crowdfunding in ways that will eventually allow it to release its full 
potential. 
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